Reaction to: Perspectives on the Declaration of Principles regarding GERD by four Ethiopian scholars

8 Apr

By Keffyalew Gebremedhin – The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

Since the signing of the Khartoum Declaration (henceforth referred to as KD) between Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan on March 23, 2015, we have witnessed the widespread skepticisms and torrents of sharp criticisms most educated Ethiopians have reserved for the agreement.

At the center of the discourse is an assumed effort by the three countries to determine modalities/mechanisms pertaining to future uses of the waters of the Blue Nile. We have thus come to a point that should impress on Ethiopians – citizens on both sides of the issue – of the need to carefully digest KD’s substance and synthesize the magic that has formed the flesh and blood of its ten articles vis-à-vis Ethiopia’s national interests and international law.

No doubt, the right of access to the media in the Americas, Europe and elsewhere have helped the diaspora in foreign lands to express their views more freely on this vital issue – undeniably in some instances without the restraints this requires. At the same time, it should be noted that even at home educated Ethiopians have hardly been reticent, notwithstanding the courage it takes to refuse their voices to be drowned by state political propaganda.

For instance, Raji Gezahegn, who is a lecturer in law at the Wolaita Sodo University, on the April 4, 2015 issue of The Reporter opines:

    “… [T]he ‘with us or against us’ ethic of Ethiopian politics will entice those who oppose the government to condemn the declaration as anti-Ethiopian and those who support the government as just another evidence of the incumbent’s omniscience.”

This shows that, it has become increasingly clear that to help our nation see a better picture what all sides need is to adopt a stop-and-carefully-reflect attitude. The truth and revelation we need would not come in one package or overnight, so long as Ethiopians are not burning their middle night oil. Yet, we need to keep searching until we find that which would help us protect our country’s interests in the world, in this case now on the Nile River.

It is with this consideration that I would in this piece offer my assessment of the article by four Ethiopians of renown: Professors Minga Negash (Accounting), Seid Hassan (Economics), Mammo Muchie (Research Professor of Innovation) and Abu Girma (Economics). Their article is titled: Perspectives on the Declaration of Principles regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

These are individuals that teach in different universities far away from home, in countries such as the United States in the West, Japan in the East and South Africa at the southern tip of Africa. In this article, these academicians have labored to bring light to their fellow citizens on water issues in the Nile Basin, notwithstanding that the realm of international law, especially water law, is further removed from their respective specializations.

At the outset, noticeable in some respects is that their perspective seems to evolve; it means it has entailed editing some of their own earlier positions in previous articles that came in a span of a year between April 30, 2014 and April 5, 2015. In the case of the initial article, for instance, Addis Fortune reacted in an article entitled: Hawkish Ethiopia Emboldened by Intellectuals’ Support of Mega Dam. For that, the paper picks from their words: “Egypt’s no dam policy, or stance against large energy producing dams in upstream countries, is a misplaced opposition and therefore calls for a new thinking in Cairo.”

They got their wish in late March this year. Cairo has now agreed with Ethiopia in KD in principle on newer approach for GERD’s cylinders to roll using the waters of the Blue Nile. Many critics see their April 30 article, Misplaced opposition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as having succeeded in encouraging the TPLF regime to push starting negotiations with Egypt and the Sudan from a clean slate, i.e., starting from zero. This idea is borrowed from Wuhibegezer Ferede and Shiferawu Abebe’s Efficacy of Water Treaties in the Eastern Nile Basin, Africa Spectrum, 49, 1, 55-67 (2014). After the signing of the KD and lots of criticisms later about the secrecy, Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom on April 1, 2015 came to the media to brief Ethiopians. In one of the briefings, he confirmed, as quoted by The Reporter that Ethiopia approached the negotiations exactly in that manner in February 2015, proposing to the parties the clean slate approach; he said the three countries came together to work on that basis. In explaining that the minister says:

    “በዚህ መሠረት በየካቲት ወር 2007 ዓ.ም. ውስጥ በውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስቴር ግብዣ ከግብፅና ከሱዳን ጋር በሒልተን ሆቴል አዋሽ አዳራሽ በዝግ ድርድር መካሄዱን ተናግረዋል፡፡ውይይቱ ከመጀመሩ በፊት ግን ውጤት ማግኘት ከተፈለገ ቀድሞ ሲነሱ የነበሩ ጥያቄዎች በዚህኛው ድርድር እንዳይነሱ፣ ጋዜጠኞች እንዳይገቡ፣ በአጠቃላይ ድርድሩ ከዜሮ እንዲጀመር በኢትዮጵያ በኩል የቀረበው ሐሳብ ተቀባይነት አግኝቶ ድርድሩ መጀመሩን ገልጸዋል፡፡” “በመሆኑም በዓለም አቀፍ መርህ ላይ ተመሥርተን እንደ አዲስ እንነጋገር በሚል ሐሳብ ላይ ተስማምተን ሦስቱምአገሮች የየራሳቸውን መደራደሪያ እንዲያመጡ በተስማማነው መሠረት የቀረቡት መደራደሪያ ነጥቦች በአብዛኛው ተመሳሳይ ነበሩ፤”

Nevertheless, without even making reference to this, in their latest article my four compatriots conclusively state, “the Agreement [KD] is unsustainable in its current form.”

Therefore, the four authors hold the view that KD’s “clauses are designed to re-assert the 1929 and 1959 water sharing agreements and the much criticized Framework for General Co-operation Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia, July 1993, Cairo, Egypt that was signed by the then Presidents of Egypt and Ethiopia.”

While I agree with the authors on a number of points, I use this piece to flag my discomfort in some respects – both the analytical side and the not so correct information they have released on substantive matters.

I would initially start off with a reaction to their introductory note, presenting my observations. As we go further into the different parts of the article, I would discuss substantive issues in the order they appear therein, especially where I have my misgivings, thus offering my views where I feel it is needed.

“Negative” and “unhealthy” discourse

The four professors open their article on the question of why the discourse on the Nile Question has become “negative” and “unhealthy” following the signing of KD. For that, they give us, in their words, “two fundamental reasons”.

Firstly, they place responsibility on Cairo’s door for the failure of negotiations thus far. In that, they attribute the problem on the Nile Basin to Egypt’s unilateralist “self-interest maximizing actions”. The four hold the view that Egypt’s heretofore ‘zero-sum strategic behavior’ has been pushed as the dominant solution to the Nile Question. Secondly, again they point their fingers at the historical ambition of Egypt to control the Nile, which still is alive. Evidence of this is, they say, the 1929 and 1959 “Nile water agreements” that have excluded Ethiopia have reared their ugly heads via the March 23 agreement between our three nations.

Thus far, as a person who had been persuaded about importance of GERD for Ethiopia in the long run already at its launch in 2011 – minus TPLF’s politics – (See: Is Ethiopia’s rendezvous with history really arriving, or are we in some fantasy?) – I have viewed it as our country’s title deed on the Nile – imprimatur, if you will, even if it must come upon Ethiopians by the will and because of TPLF’s interests. I hope that this would be taken for what it is, i.e., I share the identification by the four academicians of Egypt being persistently seized with efforts throughout history to control access to the waters of the Nile and its incessant efforts thereon to act as gatekeeper characterized by locking everyone out.

After all, that is the reason why experts remind us that the Nile Basin has remained the poorest of all international river basins. This is simply because the states and peoples of the Nile River have been deterred all along from developing and utilizing the basin’s resources, especially Ethiopia.

I must also add that in about short four last years we have witnessed as a nation Egypt’s behavior increasingly being tempered in proportion to the rise of GERD. This has made prospects of cooperation in the Nile Basin states, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt now, more reasonable than 2010 when the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was opened for signature. CFA showed us that Egyptian officials moved faster and harder, determined to scuttle it. They fully employed Cairo’s diplomatic capability in both diplomacy and in saber rattling since November 2011.

That much, I presume, not only I but also Ethiopians who think well of the nation would agree with the assessment of the four academicians.

As a matter of fact, had Ethiopian concerns about their country’s sovereignty and longstanding interests were threatened only by Egypt and the Sudan, it would have been manageable. As citizens, all Ethiopians could have stood guard, united as one nation. Unfortunately, the problem has an internal dimension. Ethiopian politics and the huge skepticism out there regarding the TPLF regime’s disloyalty to the nation’s sovereignty and its longstanding views on the Nile River have remained questionable and divisive; it has thus been our nation’s disabler, and reason for the anger of Ethiopians at their nation being forced to walk on KD’s treacherous grounds.

That is why I am not entirely sanguine with the claims of the four scholars regarding what has made the discourse so sour and negative. My reading of the many Ethiopian articles that have surfaced since the Khartoum agreement, including by the four authors of the above-mentioned article – and my contributions to the debate in two separate articles – widely differs from theirs. Accordingly, I find it strange that they should now restrict the origin of the “negative discourses” amongst Ethiopians on KD to the above-mentioned two Egyptian self-interested approaches.

My understanding is what they ought to clearly mention is the TPLF’s actions in this past quarter century. Those are equally causal to the ‘negative discourse’, because present attitude of Ethiopians is informed by the lessons of past experiences that had them repeatedly witness the TPLF injuring Ethiopia’s sovereignty and violating its territorial integrity.

Moreover, irrespective of the fact that Ethiopians only know little about what has gone into the making of the KD, there are strong doubts surrounding the latest agreement. Therefore, it is seen as having come as another abandonment of Ethiopia’s long-term interests on the Nile, with Egypt and the Sudan having been awarded the upper hand. In other words, Ethiopians have been bitterly angered by what they see in the document: one-sided accommodation and concessions by the TPLF whereby those wielding the levers of power have rendered our country incapable of defending its interests.

Official briefings are restricted to speaking about successes, giving impression about determination to move forward. Neither the TPLF prime minister nor the foreign minister chose to go into the implications of the controversial articles. For instance, the foreign minister was asked about prospects of irrigation. He brushed it off by saying Ethiopians need not waste time on what is not current and real issue.

He could have simply stated that it was not even envisioned from the start. After all, in a long interview with Egyptian television Meles in 2011 had assured Egyptians that there would be no irrigation development anywhere nearby GERD. This was omitted from the get go, possibly not to jinx Egypt, although the area is not the most suitable for agricultural development.

The unknown in the KD is the most troubling. Therefore, the question is what else has Ethiopia given up to entice Egypt?

Principle of cooperation: the KD vis-à-vis the UN Charter, international law, etc.

In their article, the four scholars want us to see that the principle of cooperation in the KD is born and bred by the 1993 agreement between Ethiopia and Egypt, signed by Meles Zenawi and Hosni Mubarak in July 1993. At the same time, citing KD’s two sub-articles of Article I, they imply it is pretentious, even if, they note, it invokes “clauses from the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses that was adopted on 21, May, 1997 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. res. 2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/5217 at 121 (1970).” I am not aware of it’s invocation of the principles in the latter declaration.

In fact, what we see in the 1993 agreement between Ethiopia and Egypt is what nations encountered later in the document that also appeared four years later in what is today’s international water law. It shows how Egyptians have been active in the elaboration of international water law, with the 1997 Convention rather in reverse taking language from what Meles and Mubarak had signed, an indication that the 1993 Ethiopia-Egypt agreement was authored by the Egyptians.

Did Meles know then what he was doing, when Egyptians dictated what he should sign, or his intention was to make Ethiopia yield to Egypt? One would be given to suspicion that he and his ruling party are determined that they to rule Ethiopia until the Second Coming, untroubled by Egypt’s practiced hands since 1958 in undermining its regional foe that has control over its water resources? I have no answer for my own question.

Nevertheless, as my four compatriots mention it in the article, I have enormous difficulties understanding the purpose of the sentence or the cross-referencing between the 1993 and 1997 documents. Egypt had beaten Ethiopia there. Especially, I see no reason why now KD’s invocation of the May 1997 UN Convention should make it phony, i.e., once the Convention has been adopted as international water law. In fact – just for the record – contrary to present actions and views, Ethiopia at the time of the Convention’s adoption had raised alarms that upper riparian states were made to surrender, with lower riparian interests served better by the new international instrument.

For instance, as far as Ethiopia is concerned, contrary to what the four academicians think and believe about Egypt’s laws inherited from colonial times, Article 3(1) of the Convention states:

    “In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the present Convention.”

In sub-article (2), it is indicated that the only thing riparian states could do is to “consider harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles of the present Convention.”

To me, this speaks for the need to ensure that new agreements, be it KD or any others or interpretations that follow and/or implementation mechanisms, need to be negotiated with utmost seriousness and crafted with Ethiopian eyes on the real thing – Ethiopians fully and equitably benefiting from the waters of the Blue Nile.

Anyone who has properly checked the official records of the United Nations on this matter could see that on May 21, 1997, the Ethiopian delegation during the adoption of the Convention had made a statement lambasting it as biased, as shown in A/51/PV.99. As I discussed in my article of April 1, 2015, at the time Ethiopia stated:

    “[T]he well-established right of equitable utilization in the Convention was the only reason and incentive for any upper riparian country in the position of Ethiopia to accept the Convention. In the absence of this clearly defined right, the Convention will mean very little to these countries. The rest of the Convention, in most cases, is tilted towards the lower riparian States and imposes obligations on upper riparian States which appear burdensome and difficult to meet, particularly by a developing country such as Ethiopia.”

Ethiopia also indicated in that statement:

    [Ethiopia has] “abstained in the voting on the resolution just adopted. We took this position because we believe that the text of the Convention, to be annexed to the resolution and opened for signature, falls short of achieving the required balance, in particular in safeguarding the interests of upper riparian States such as Ethiopia. This is evident in most of the provisions of the Convention, and particularly with regard to article 7 and part III of the Convention on planned measures, which put an onerous burden on upper riparian States.”

Those who gave the instruction this to be Ethiopia’s position are the same TPLF leadership. What induced them to change that position remains unclear, at least to me. Like Ethiopia, Egypt had also abstained on the resolution. But the Egyptian concern was entirely different; it had to do with its concern in case the new Convention railroaded customary laws, such as 1929, 1959, etc. Please note that Egypt did this notwithstanding the provision of Article 3 of the Convention, I already discussed, which protect its interests. Therefore, Egypt had not fully shut the door on the Convention, as has Ethiopia. That is what makes KD’s intents now questionable.

On sources of law, I say to my four countrymen that bringing GA resolution 2625 of 1970 into this – just because it makes reference to those lofty principles of international law, such as friendly relations between nations, self-determination, sovereign equality, mutuality of relations, etc., – is either uninformed, simply irrelevant, or if not any of the two, at least, it is self-defeating in this case.

Each resolution in the United Nations has its particular origin and history, like an individual or a family. This is in the nature of conference diplomacy.

When a nation feels uncertain of some implication or becomes suspicious that its interests would be threatened down the road, it would seek to water it down, or block action during the consideration of an issue, or find common ground through old agreed principles in internationally-accepted positions. In short, the continual recounting of such principles is sort of palliative aiming to assuage or diminish the unknown or implicit concerns of others. For instance, resolution 2625 of 1970 came into existence after nearly three years of negotiations that started in August 1968, when the Cold War reached one of its apexes due to USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.

UN report especially the repertory of practices show that the above-mentioned resolution came to life because of the need to give greater “compatibility between international treaties and Charter” on one hand and “Compatibility between regional arrangements and the Charter” on the other.

The best example is the situation in Czechoslovakia and USSR’s invasion of that country. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, dated August 21, 1968 the representatives of Canada, Denmark, France, Paraguay, the United Kingdom and the United States requested an immediate meeting of the Council to consider the serious situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

At the time, the USSR was claiming that it was only providing assistance to Czechoslovakia “in conformity with existing treaty obligations” under article 5 of its 1955 the Warsaw Pact Treaty. On the other hand, the Czechoslovaks were knocking at every door informing the world that they were invaded, although Warsaw Pact members.

Therefore, the UN strongly felt the need to ensure primacy of Article 103 of the Charter by adopting resolution 2625. While the Security Council was seized with the issue of peace and security in Eastern Europe, the International Law Commission (ILC) expedited its discussion of Article 103 of the Charter, which reads:

“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”

This is the story of the very loaded resolution 2625 of 1970.

Now my question to my four countrymen is what does this resolution have to do with the GERD and Nile water uses that they should seek its services in the case of KD?

Another troubling point is the reference they make to the countries that have acceded to the 1997 Convention. In that connection, they state:

“It is however important to note that 17 years after its adoption, other than the United Kingdom no major power has signed the non-navigational use of international waters Convention. By the end of 2014, only 38 countries (out of about 194 Member States) have signed/accepted and ratified it. It is also interesting to note that 11 of the 38 countries are located in the African continent. None of the three countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan) have signed, accepted or ratified this Convention.”

Again, besides the above being factually wrong, what purpose it serves is not clear. First of all, the power and influence of an international convention should not be viewed through the number of member states approving it or their status, i.e., big power or a developing country. True, the more states ratify it, it helps to harmonize laws of nations and create similar outlooks on issues. However, conventions are acceded to because states have need for them.

If they are not rushing into signing it, it is because they either have problems of a political or logistical nature or it deals with issues and problems they have long settled. Let us look into these aspects from national experiences.

For instance, the US and Somalia are the only two nations that to this day have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of Children, according to the UN Treaty Section. However, this does not mean that the US does not believe in the rights of children. But, they say, ratification involves complicated processes. Somalia had no government until recently.

Yes, the Convention has counted nearly 18 years since its adoption. But nations see through it lots of complications, due to the complex implementation processes and arrangements. For some other countries like Canada or the United States, United Kingdom, most of Old Europe, it has little urgency, since most of these countries have settled transboundary river issues decades ago.

For instance, the US had gone through a number of up and down with Mexico over the Rio Grande River. The lessons of these have finally enabled the US to contribute as lesson to the international community about the Harmon Doctrine, which initially said it did not care to others beyond our borders. Later, this policy was reversed. That is why students of international law thank God the Harmon Doctrine was buried a century ago.

In this connection, bear in mind that the US has affirmatively approved the 1997 Convention of May 21, 1997. Interestingly, at the Convention’s adoption (See A/51/PV.99), it was the representative of Mexico that spoke on behalf of the US, among other states from Europe, Americas and Asia, conveying his conviction on their behalf that the Convention would contribute “to the equitable and reasonable use of transboundary water resources and their ecosystems, as well as to their preservation, to the benefit of current and future generations.”

On the other hand, countries that have issues with neighbors on watercourses are wary of acceding the Convention – for example, China and Turkey. Also 14 European nations have acceded to the Convention. As to the major powers, true the UK – permanent member of the UN Security Council – has ratified it, as has France – another permanent member of the UN Security Council, whom my four countrymen failed to acknowledge. There are also intermediate powers in the ratification column like The Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, etc. These are countries that have long settled problems relating to their transboundary rivers very long ago.

The fact that there are 11 African countries have acceded to the Convention must be taken as an indication that a number of these nations have problems and there is need to work to attain the goals and objectives of the new water law to benefit by developing their watercourses. Those that are not in any watercourses surely have something better to do. The laggards also someday wake up and would sign it.

Finally, a minor but serious oversight problem is the date when the Convention came into force. The article by the four scholars claims it has come into force in April 2014 – without even specific date. This claim is wrong; it conflicts with Article 36 (1) of the Convention, which states:

“The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary- General of the United Nations.”

Bear in mind that on May 21, 1997 during the adoption of the 1997 Convention, currently the new international water law came into force on August 14, 2014. If that is the case, the 35th nation signatory, Viet Nam, acceded to the Convention on May 19, 2014. Ninety days after its ratification makes the date into which the Convention came into force should be August 14, 2014.

Principle of Development, Regional Integration and Sustainability

To my mind, instead of being speculative on issues under this topic, it would be wise for Ethiopians to find out what is entailed by the nine factors. I must confess that some of these ‘factors’ given me goose pimples. But KD is clear in its Article III that they should be used, for purposes of “ensuring [] equitable and reasonable unitization”.

For instance, there, one could ask what the purport and purpose of “The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use”. I am afraid no direct answer would be provided, especially from Ethiopia and Egypt.

What this brings to mind is the fact that since November 2010, Egypt had gone public in requesting Ethiopia to take it easy on its use of the Nile to allow Egypt to have more uses of it. The idea is to suggest that Ethiopia has abundant rains, lakes and other rivers. Egypt’s Ambassador to Ethiopia Tarek Ghoneim, respected professional, brought this to light first in an interview with Capital on November 4, 2010. He said, “Ethiopia has many sources of water; it has good rainfall, while Egypt depends entirely on the Nile. That is 95 percent of our water sources. As you know, apart from the Nile, we only have desert.”

At the time as a private citizen in retirement, I wrote what I felt, wherein I stated, “Admittedly, it is not so common in diplomatic history for a resident ambassador in times of peace to hit his hosts on the eye”, as did Ambassador Ghoneim.

On the assessment side of the article by the four scholars, I am afraid they have failed to give their attention to more serious issues than the four points they have identified.

If I go in reverse order, for example, my question would be why they waste time on seeking to find out why groundwater was not included. To my understanding it has been in Article III, subsumed in the different sub-articles. As a matter of fact, we also have data on groundwater for most of the countries. In the past, Egyptian used to say they have only 3 percent ground water. In reality, however, latest studies show that Egypt has abundant brackish water, which is found in most of the country and that could bee cheaply processed through solar energy, according to Mariam G. Salim.

Yes, I agree with the four scholars about the need to obligate downstream states to invest not only for conservation and rationalization, but also for water development. Still, the onus is on the TPLF regime, whether it is willing to ensure that our country could become beneficiary of its natural resources.

In the long run, we must keep at the back of our mind that engagement with riparian neighbors is vitally important, given the provisions of Article 3(1). Most importantly, a clear picture and vision must emerge about cooperative undertakings to ensure that water is not misused or passed on to others, before it satisfies the needs of local people. That is also what is implied in the equity principle within national frontiers, and later at the level of a basin.

Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

The proposal by the four Ethiopian scholars here is to have “a “third party”, particularly in the context of the Nile Basin Cooperation Framework Agreement may lead to a better outcome.” I regret to say that at this stage this is superfluous. In future, this and other instruments could be found. At the moment, however, Egypt is not party to the CFA. Ethiopia cannot pull it by the nose.

On the other hand, I am not comfortable with their mindset that international arbitration is permanently stacked against Ethiopia. Twice or thrice, it may have happened in the past, because of international politics (1966) and the arbitrators (2000). Therefore, I refuse to accept that the dial of international arbitration is permanently set against Ethiopia.

A minor example though and an issue Egypt attaches huge importance, after the CFA the ailing Mubarak toured Europe and his senior diplomats flooded European capitals in 2010 and 2011 to drum up support against upper riparian states. The only convert they had was Silvio Berlusconi, who had delivered only lip service.

Finally, a major preoccupation Ethiopians should be, as far as the dam is concerned, is the reservoir water-filling phase. Would the TPLF do Egypt’s bidding or find formula to accommodate both nations’ interests, or are their arms folded and waiting for the international experts to weigh in? It is understood that the experts’ recommendations are final. If unacceptable, Ethiopia cannot wiggle out.

This in view, has the TPLF chosen in this agreement to gamble on giving Egypt major concessions or it has something else in mind? I do not know the answer to my question!

One thing we should assume is that the members of the experts’ group are reasonable people, who realize that they have the power to avoid conflicts in the Nile Basin by doing the right thing by both upper and lower riparian states.

Egypt would definitely do everything within its powers to get the period for filling the reservoir extended up to seven years.

While praying for better rains, Ethiopian experts – I know we have many of them – I hope they would come with good alternative recommendations in the short time before the experts designated by the tripartite group deliver their verdict.

Related articles:

    The Khartoum Declaration on GERD & the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses

    Full text of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have signed to govern Nile River water use


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