Tag Archives: ethiopia

‘ይቅር …. ታ…. ታታ ….. ሿሿሿ’—    የጳጉሜው ይቅርታና ያሬድ ኃይለማርያም ትዕዝብት!

7 Sep

Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

ዛሬ የይቅርታ ቀን ተብሎ መሰየሙን እና አንዳንድ የመንግስት ባላሥልጣናት፤ እንዲሁም የኃይማኖት አባቶች ይቅርታ ሲጠይቁ እየሰማው ነው። በሃሳብ ደረጃ ነገርየው ጥሩ ነው። ይቺን ነገር አምናና፣ ካቻምናም አድርገናት ነበር። ከአምናው ይቅርታ መጠያየቅ ወዲህ በአገራችን የተፈጸሙትን ነገሮች ብቻ ማሰብ ይህ ነገር ከልብ ነው? ያስብላል። የኃይማኖት አባቶችን እና የሕዝብን ለጊዜው ልተውና በባለሥልጣናት በየአመቱ ስለሚጠየቀው ይቅታ ይችን ልል ወደድኩ።

ይቅርታ ጥፋትን እና ጸጸትን ተከትሎ የሚመጣ ነገር ነው። በፖለቲካው አውድ ጥፋት ሳይኖር ይቅርታ አይጠየቅም። ጥፋት፤ ከዛ መጸጸት፤ ከዛ ተጠያቂነት፣ ከዛ ይቅርታ ይከተላል። ፖለቲከኞች እና ባለሥልጣናት የሚፈጽሙት ጥፋት በአገር እና በሕዝብ ጥቅምና መብት ላይ ያነጣጠሩና ጉዳታቸውም ከፍ ያለ ስለሆነ ይቅርታ የሚጠይቁትም አገርን እና ሕዝብን ነው። በመሆኑም ፖለቲከኞች፤ በተለይም ባለሥልጣናት የሚጠይቁት ይቅርታ ሌላው ተራው ሰው እንደሚጠይቀው ይቅርታ ሾላ በድፍኑ አይነት ነገር አይደለም። ቢያንስ ከዚህ የሚከተሉትን የይቅርታ ቋንቋዎች እና ሃሳቦች የያዘ መሆን አለበት።

፩ኛ/ ተገልጾ ለታወቀው ጥፋት መጸጸትን መግለጽ (Expressing regret)

፪ኛ/ ለተፈጸመው ጥፋት ኃላፊነትን መውሰድ (Accepting responsibility)

፫ኛ/ የተጎዳን መካስ ወይም ያበላሹትን ማስተካከል (Making restitution)

፬ኛ/ ዳግም ተመሳሳይ ጥፋት እንዳይፈጸም የሚያስችል ከእውነተኛ ፍላጎት የመነጨ የእርምት እርምጃ (Genuinely repenting) እና

፭ኛ/ ተበዳይ ወገን ይቅርታ እንዲያረግ መጠየቅ (Requesting forgiveness)

እኔ ይሄን ካልኩኝ ዘንዳ ዛሬ አቶ ታከለ ኡማ እና ሌሎች ባለሥልጣናት በቴሌቪዥን መስኮት ብቅ ብለው “ሳናውቅ ለበደልናችሁ ይቅርታ” ያሉበትን መንገድ መፈተሽ ደግሞ የእናንተ ሥራ ይሁን። ይህ አይነቱ ይቅርታ አምና እና ካቻምና ከተደረጉት የይቅርታ ጥያቄዎች በምን ይለያሉ? ከዛስ በይቅርታው ማግስት ምን ሆነ?

እንግዲህ እኔ ፖለቲከኞች ስለሚጠይቁት የይቅርታ አይነት ከላይ ያሉትን አምስት ነጥቦች አስቀምጫለሁ። እናንተ የሹሞቹን ይቅርታ በእነዚህ መስፈርቶች እየመዘናችሁ ‘ይቅር ብለናል’ ማለቱን ለእናንተው ልተው።

እንደ እኔ የፖለቲከኞቻችን ይቅርታ ከላይ ያለውን መስፈርት እሲኪያሟላ እና ከልብ እስኪሆ ድረስ፤ ‘ይቅር …. ታ…. ታታ ….. ሿሿሿ’ ብያለሁ።

መልካም ሰንበት!

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ግፈኞችን አራጆችን ያስደነገጠው የኢትዮጵያ ኦርቶዶክስ ተዋህዶ ቤተክርስቲያን መግለጫ

3 Sep

Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

 

 

ኢሰመኮ ጋዜጣዊ መግለጫ: አፋጣኝ ምላሽ የሚሹ የሰብዓዊ መብት ጉዳዮች!

25 Aug

Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

(አዲስ አበባ፤ ነሐሴ 8 /2012) የኢትዮጵያ ሰብዓዊ መብቶች ኮሚሽን (ኢሰመኮ) የአርቲስት ሀጫሉ ሁንዴሳ ግድያን ተከትሎ በተከሰተው የሰላም መደፍረስ ምክንያት የተከሰተውን የሰብዓዊ መብቶች ጥሰት ሁኔታ ላይ ፈጣን ምርመራ ማድረግ መጀመሩን በተለያዩ የሚዲያ አውታሮች ማሳወቁ ይታወሳል፡፡

ኮሚሽኑ ባለፉት ሁለት ሳምንታትም ከ40 በላይ ችግሩ ተከስቶባቸዋል በተባሉ የኦሮሚያ አካባቢዎች ላይ የምርመራ ቡድኖችን በማሰማራት ጉዳት የደረሰባቸውን ግለሰቦች፣ ቤተሰቦቻቸውን እንዲሁም ምስክሮችን እና የመንግስት አካላትን በማነጋገር መረጃ ለማሰባሰብ እና አሁን ያሉበትን ሁኔታ ለመገምገም ጥረት አድርጓል፡፡

ኮሚሽኑ የሰበሰበውን መረጃ ከሰብዓዊ መብት መርሆዎች አንፃር በመተንተን ዝርዝር የምርመራውን ግኝቶች እና የመፍትሄ ሀሳቦች በቅርብ ጊዜ ውስጥ የሚያሳውቅ መሆኑን እየገለጸ በምርመራው ወቅት የታዩና በአፋጣኝ መፍትሄ ያስፈልጋቸዋል ብሎ ያሰባቸውን የሰብዓዊ መብቶች ጥሰት ስጋቶችን ለሚመለከታቸው አካላት ሁሉ በይፋ በማሳወቅ ተገቢ እርምጃ አንዲወሰድ ለማድረግ ያስችል ዘንድ ይህንን መግለጫ አውጥቷል፡፡

1. አሁንም የጥቃት ስጋት ያለባቸው ነዋሪዎች በተመለከተ

የምርመራ ቡድኖች በተጓዙባቸው በአብዛኛው አካባቢዎች በአሁኑ ሰዓት የተሻለ መረጋጋት ያለ መሆኑን ለመረዳት ቢቻልም በአንዳንድ አካባቢዎች በሰዎች ህይወት፣ አካላዊ ደህንነት እና ንብረት ላይ የጥቃት ስጋት እንዳለ ኮሚሽኑ ለመገንዘብ ችሏል፡፡ በእነዚህ አካባቢዎች የሚገኙ ተጎጂዎች እና ለጥቃት ተጋላጭ የሆኑ የህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች በተለያዩ ቡድኖች የጥቃት ማስፈራሪያ እና ዛቻዎች እየደረሳቸው እንደሆነ ለኮሚሽኑ አስረድተዋል፡፡

ለአብነትም፡-

● በዶዶላ ከተማ የሚገኙ የጉዳቱ ተጠቂዎች እንዳስረዱት ከግጭቱ በኋላ ማለትም በሐምሌ 9 ቀን 2012 ዓ.ም. ከ60 ሰዎች በላይ ስማቸውን በመዘርዘር ከተማውን ለቀው ካልወጡ እርምጃ የሚወሰድባቸው መሆኑን የሚገልጽ ማስጠንቀቂያ ያዘለ ወረቀት መሰራጨቱን፣
● በባቱ ከተማ ተጎጂዎች አሁንም ከተማውን ለቃችሁ ውጡ የሚል ማስፋራሪያ በስልክና በአካል እየደረሳቸው መሆኑን፣
● ሻሸመኔ ከተማ ማንነታቸው ያልታወቁ ሰዎች ቤት ለቤት እየሄዱ ከ5 እስከ 10 ሺህ ብር ካላመጣችሁ አሁንም ንብረታችሁን እናቃጥላለን እንዲሁም እንገላችኋለን በማለት ማስፈራሪያ የሚደርሳቸው ሰዎች እንዳሉ እና፣
● በተወሰኑ አካባቢዎች ደግሞ በመንግስት የፀጥታ አካላት ሳይቀር ሰዎች እየተደበደቡና ዛቻ እየተፈፀመባቸው መሆኑን (ለምሳሌ፡ በቡራዩ ከተማ በተለይ ከታ ተብሎ በሚታወቀው አካባቢ እንዲሁም በጉና ወረዳ ነገሌ ከተማ) ለማወቅ ተችሏል፡፡

 

ምክረ ሀሳቦች

በኢፌዴሪ ሕገመንግስት እና በዓለም ዓቀፍ የሰብዓዊ መብት ድንጋጌዎች እንደተቀመጠው መንግስት የሰዎችን ሰብዓዊ መብቶች አክብሮ የመንቀሳቀስ እና በሌሎች መንግስታዊ ባልሆኑ አካላትም ጥሰት እንዳይከሰት የመከላከል እና ጥበቃ የማድረግ ኃላፊነት አለበት፡፡ በተለይም በተፈጠረው ችግር ከፍተኛ ጉዳት የደረሰባቸው ሰዎች ከጉዳታቸው ሳያገግሙ ለሌላ ጥቃት እንዳይዳረጉ ከፍተኛ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ ይገባል፡፡ ስለዚህም የሚመለከታቸው የፌዴራል መንግስት እና የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሰት አስተዳደር እና የፀጥታ አካላት፡-

● ከላይ በተጠቀሱት ስፍራዎች የደረሱ ማስፈራሪያዎች እና ዛቻዎችን በፍጥነት በመመርመር የመከላከል እና አጥፊዎችን የመቆጣጠር ስራ እንዲሰራ፣
● የሕግ አስከባሪ እና የፀጥታ አካላት ኃላፊነታቸውን በሚወጡበት ወቅት የሰዎችን ሰብዓዊ መብቶች በማክበር እንዲንቀሳቀሱ ቁጥጥር በማድረግ እና ችግሮች በተከሰቱባቸው ቦታዎችም በፍጥነት የማስተካከያ እርምጃ እንዲወስዱ እና ተጠያቂነትን ለማረጋገጥ እንዲሰሩ፣ እና
● ከላይ በተጠቀሱት ስፍራዎች እና የፀጥታ ስጋት ይኖርባቸዋል ተብለው በሚታሰቡ ሌሎች ስፍራዎችን በመለየት ተጨማሪ ጥበቃ እንዲደረግ ኮሚሽኑ ምክረ ሀሳብ ያቀርባል፡፡

2. ሰብዓዊ እርዳታ፣ ድጋፍ እና የተፈናቀሉ ተጎጂዎች ሁኔታ

ምርመራ በተደረገባቸው አካባቢዎች የሚገኙ ሰዎች አካላዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊ እና ስነ ልቦናዊ ጉዳት እንደደረሰባቸው ለማወቅ የተቻለ ቢሆንም ተጎጂዎችን ወደ ነበሩባቸው ቦታዎች ለመመለስ እና መልሶ ለማቋቋም መጠነ ሰፊ ስራ እና ጊዜ የሚያስፈልግ እንደሆነ ኮሚሽኑ ይገነዘባል፡፡ ይሁንና ተጎጂዎቹ ለዕለቱ በህይወት ለመቆየት የሚያስፈልጋቸውን ሰብዓዊ እና ሌሎች ድጋፎችን ማቅረብ እና ተፈናቅለው ለሚገኙ ዜጎች ተገቢውን ጥበቃ በማድረግ ወደ ቤታቸው የሚመለሱበትን ሁኔታ ማመቻቸት ጊዜ የማይሰጥ ከመሆኑ አንፃር የሚከተሉት ጉዳዮች ፈጣን ትኩረት የሚሹ እንደሆኑ ኮሚሽኑ ተገንዝቧል፡፡

● በተለይም የመኖሪያ ቤታቸው እና ንብረታቸው የወደመባቸው ተጎጂዎች አሁንም በሰው ቤት፣ በኃይማኖት ተቋማት እና በሌሎች ስፍራዎች (ለአብነትም በዶዶላ ከተማ በገብረክርስቶስ ቤተ ክርስቲያን፣ በአሳሳ ከተማ ገብርኤል ቤተክርስቲያን፣ በሻሸመኔ ከተማ ተክለ ሀይማኖት፣ ቅዱስ ሚካኤል፣ ጊዮርጊስ እና ኡራኤል አብያተክርስትያናት፣ በአጋርፋ እርሻ ኮሌጅ) ተጠልለው የሚገኙ ቢሆንም እነዚህን ዜጎች ወደ ቤታቸው እንዲመለሱ የሚደረገው ጥረት ዝቅተኛ መሆኑን፣
● በአብዛኛው አካባቢዎች ተፈናቅለው ለሚገኙ ተጎጂዎች በመንግስት አካላት እና በግብረ ሰናይ ድርጅቶች ድጋፍ ቢደረግላቸውም፤ የሚሰጣቸው የዕለት ምግብ እርዳታና ድጋፍ (ለምሳሌ አጋርፋ፣ ወሊሶ ከተማ፣ ሻሸመኔ ከተማ)፣ የህክምና አገልግሎት (ለምሳሌ አርሲ ነገሌ ከተማ) እንዲሁም መልሶ የማቋቋም እንቅስቃሴው በቂ አለመሆኑን ፣
● በተወሰኑ አካባቢዎች በተለይም በአብያተክርስትያናትና ሌሎች ቦታዎች የተጠለሉ ሰዎችን ለደህንነታቸው ማረጋገጫ ባልተሰጠበት ሁኔታ የመንግስት ኃላፊዎች ወደ ቤታችሁ ካልተመለሳችሁ እርዳታ አታገኙም የሚል አስገዳጅ ቅድመ ሁኔታ መጫናቸው (ለምሳሌ በሻሸመኔ እና አጋርፋ) ተገቢ አለመሆኑን ለማየት ተችሏል፡፡

 

ምክረ ሀሳቦች

ኮሚሽኑ የችግሩን ስፋት እና ጥልቀት የሚረዳ ቢሆንም መንግስት ለሰብአዊ መብቶች ጥሰት ተጎጂዎች አፋጣኝ ድጋፍ የማድረግ ኃላፊነት ስላለበትና በተለይም አሁን ያለንበት የኮቪድ-19 ወረርሽኝ እና የክረምት ወቅት ስለሆነ ተጎጂዎች ለተጨማሪ ጉዳት እንዳይዳረጉ ማድረግ እጅግ የቅድሚያ ትኩረት ሊሰጠው ይገባል፡፡ ስለዚህም፡-

●የሚመለከታቸው የፌዴራል እና የኦሮሚያ ክልላዊ መንግሰት አካላት፣ ከላይ በተጠቀሱትም ሆነ በሌሎች አካባቢዎች ከቤታቸው የተፈናቀሉ ሰዎችን ዝርዝር መረጃ በማጠናከር፣ ተገቢውን ጥበቃ እና አስፈላጊውን ሁሉ ድጋፍ በማድረግ በፍጥነት ወደ ቤታቸው እንዲመለሱ በማድረግ ስራ ላይ እንዲረባረቡ፣
● የፌዴራል እና የክልሉ መንግሰታት ሕብረተሰቡን እንዲሁም ዓለም ዓቀፍ እና ሀገር አቀፍ ግብረ ሰናይ ድርጅቶችን በማስተባበር የዕለት ምግብ እርዳታ፣ አስፈላጊ ቁሳቁሶች፣ ከኮቪድ-19 ቫይረስ ለመጠበቅ ወይም ለመከላከል የሚረዱ ቁሳቁሶች፣ የህክምናና የስነልቦና አገልግሎት እና ሌሎች ድጋፎችን ችግሩ በሚስተዋልባቸዉ አከባቢዎች ለሚገኙ ተጎጂዎች በፍጥነት እንዲያቀርቡ ኮሚሽኑ ምክረ ሀሳብ ያቀርባል፡፡

3. የእስረኞች የሰብዓዊ መብቶች አያያዝን በተመለከተ

ኮሚሽኑ ምርመራ ባካሄደባቸው አካባቢዎች ብዙ ቁጥር ያላቸው ሰዎች ከተፈጠረው ችግር ጋር በተያያዘ በእስር ላይ እንደሚገኙ ለመገንዘብ የቻለ ሲሆን እስከ አሁን በጎበኛቸው በተለይ በኦሮሚያ ክልል የሚገኙ የእስር ቦታዎች የሚከተሉት አሳሳቢ የሰብዓዊ መብት ችግሮች ተስተውለዋል ፡፡

● በብዙ አከባቢዎች ተጠርጣሪዎች በአነስተኛ ቦታና ክፍሎች ውስጥ በተጨናነቀ ሁኔታ መታሰራቸውን ተከትሎ የኮቪድ-19 ቫይረስ ተጋላጭነትን መጨመሩ ፣
● የምግብ እና የንፅህና መጠበቂያ ቁሳቁስ አቅርቦት አነስተኛ መሆኑ፣
● የተወሰኑ ታሳሪዎች ድብደባና ኢሰብዓዊ አያያዝ እንደተፈጸመባቸውና ይህም ድርጊት በተገቢው ሁኔታ አለመጣራቱ እና ተጠያቂነት ያለመኖሩ፣
● በአንዳንድ አካባቢዎች ሕፃናት እና አዋቂዎች አንድ ላይ መታሰራቸው፣
● ፍርድ ቤት በዋስትና የለቀቃቸውን እስረኞች የተለያዩ ምክንያቶችን በመስጠት በእስር ማቆየት፣
● የተወሰኑ ታሳሪዎች በአፋጣኝ ወደ ፍርድ ቤት አለማቅረብ ናቸው፡፡

 

ምክረ ሀሳቦች

ከተከሰተው የሰላም መደፍረስ ችግር ስፋት አንፃር የእስር ሁኔታን በሚመለከት የመንግስት አቅም ውስንነት እንዳለ ኮሚሽኑ ቢገነዘብም በቁጥጥር ስር የሚውሉ ሰዎች የአያያዝና ሰብዓዊ መብቶች አጠባበቅ ሁኔታ ችላ ሊባል አይገባም፡፡
ስለዚህም የሚመለከታቸው የፌዴራል እና የክልሉ መንግስት አካላት፡-

● የእስረኛ ቁጥርን ለመቀነስ የወንጀል ምርመራ ስራውን በፍጥነት ማካሄድና በነፃ እና በዋስ መለቀቅ ያለባቸውን እስረኞች በአፋጣኝ በመለየት መልቀቅ፣
● እስከ አሁን ፍርድ ቤት ያልቀረቡ ታሳሪዎችን በአፋጣኝ ወደ ፍርድ ቤት ማቅረብ እና የዋስትና መብት የተረጋገጠላቸውን እስረኞች ዋስትናውን አክብሮ ከእስር መልቀቅ፣
● የኢሰብዓዊ አያያዝ እና ድብደባ አቤቱታዎችን በአፋጣኝ በማጣራት የጥፋተኞችን ተጠያቂነት ማረጋገጥ፣
● በብዙ እስር ቦታዎች የሚታየውን መጨናነቅ ለመቀነስ ሌሎች ጊዜያዊ ማቆያ ቦታዎችን ማመቻቸት፣ ለሕፃናት ልጆች የተለየ ማቆያ ስፍራ ማዘጋጀት እና የምግብና የንጽህና መጠበቂያ ቁሳቁስ አቅርቦት የሚሻሻልበትን መንገድ ማመቻቸት ያስፈልጋል ፡፡

 

20 Congressmen write their concerns about Ethiopia’s worsening situation to Mike Pompeo

22 Aug

Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

 

Mishmash of Economic Priorities Complicate ‘Beacon of Prosperity’ Ambitions

22 Aug

It is not uncommon for economic policies to go under the radar. Still, neither is it normal for a policy agenda as critical as the Homegrown Economic Reform to have disappeared from discussions.

Where is it now? One wonders when seeing the prominence in its place of the 10-Year Perspective Development Plan, a strategic document for the next decade that government officials are currently raving about. Carrying the slogan, “Ethiopia: An African Beacon of Prosperity,” and visually presented against a green background, it has been under discussion over the past month.

Heads of federal government agencies – from the Ministry of Culture & Tourism to the Civil Service Commission and the Peace Ministry – have participated in sessions where their 10-year plans have been discussed. Senior envoys have been called home to spend no less than 10 days to brainstorm the foreign affairs agenda for the next decade.

The compatibility or overwriting state of this plan – authored under the stewardship of Fitsum Assefa (PhD) – with the Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda architected under Eyob Tekalegn (PhD) was never made clear. The ambiguity could be by design, a defining characteristic of the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD).

Strikingly, complete policy documents pertaining to development strategies have yet to be made public, in both cases, despite constant remonstrations from interested parties. The Planning & Development Commission has not bothered to make public documents detailing the specifics of the Plan. This should not have been the case even if these documents are currently in the drafting process.

But there is no shortage of footage of the discussions, and economic targets have been presented in their generality. Leisurely. “Quality” economic development, ensuring private sector-led growth, realising competitiveness, institutional transformation, improving inclusivity and building a “green” economy, as Fitsum stated, are the primary areas of focus.

She could not have been vaguer, or harder to disagree with. Except for the commitment to enhance the role of the private sector in the economy, the rest are broad strokes that should be the targets of any economic management under any circumstance. The devil is in the details. But as things stand now, the devil has been left to the imagination.

The presentations of the targets of the Plan up to this point are interesting in their similarities with the successive editions of the Growth & Transformation Plan (GTP), especially in the pace of development that is intended. It plans for an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of around 10pc on average for the next decade and the reduction of the population under absolute poverty to seven percent.

It also envisages the creation of nearly 1.4 million jobs every year and attaining universal access to clean water and power by 2030. Improving infrastructure in roads, railways, irrigation systems and ICT has been emphasised, while 4.4 million houses are planned to be built within this period. These are all numbers betraying experience of over 10 years.

The Plan does mention the private sector more times than the GTPs did. The government’s role in the next decade would be to improve infrastructure, drafting and enforcement of policies and laws and, when it has to, investing in parts of the economy the private sector is not willing to engage in. The implication here seems to be that job creation would be the forte of the private sector.

 

In its broad strokes, the Commission is targeting the best of both worlds. There evidently is a commitment to maintaining the rapid growth in GDP of Ethiopia, which was a result of large-scale public infrastructure spending but with an emphasis on rolling back the state’s involvement in the economy. It aims to improve access to education and health services while also raising the quality of their deliveries. It intends to secure private sector-led growth while ensuring an inclusive and just distribution of wealth.

In so far as economic policies are attempts to devise the possible means toward achieving socioeconomic needs, priorities could stand in contrast to each other. It is, for instance, impractical to prime economic efficiency while also attempting to redistribute wealth to narrow the gap in income inequitably. At least in the short term, the latter has to be sacrificed for the former.

It is not clear what the strategic priorities are. There is no acknowledgement of the compromises to be made in the type of ambitious growth that is demanded or clarity in the strategy that is to be followed. Market orientation, state intervention, import-substitution and export-led planning all seem to be hinted at and considered without an overriding guiding philosophy being forwarded or explaining how these divergent strategies could be harmonised.

This partly stems from lack of a proper assessment of the reform efforts of the past two years. Early in the life of this administration, a reorientation toward private sector-led growth was proposed. Considering the state of the economy, from rising inflation to a debilitating foreign currency shortage, Ethiopia did seem overdue for tweaking of its economic priorities. It was most glaring in the management of fiscal policy. Before long, the economy found itself on a path of liberalisation and privatisation, as well as contractionary fiscal and monetary policies that seemed imminent.

The Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic threw these plans into a tailspin, and parliament recently passed one of the government’s most expansive budgets. It was what the economy demanded; but, it has not been clear how such aberrations and unexpected turns in policy were to fit in the administration’s economic philosophy. That is, if there is one.

Worse yet, it is not clear how it will inform decision-making going forward.

There are indeed developments that give some hope. The sectoral 10-year plans, currently undergoing revisions and amendments, do appear to be giving credit to the GTPs while also trying to understand their shortcomings. The previous two years of reform efforts are also part of these discussions, though it is not yet clear what assessments of it are, while other countries’ experiences are also being considered.

The various discussions being held by different agencies, open and easily accessible, will also help identify pain points. If taken sincerely, they could help develop a bottom-up path to development.

However, there needs to be a guiding principle underlying these strategies. Principal considerations of socio-political circumstances need to be weighed with calls for economic efficiency and competitiveness. The structural failures that have underpinned imbalances in external trade and foreign currency shortage for such a long time need to be measured against the fiscal interventions that are utilised whenever the going gets tougher than usual. Most critically perhaps, the urgency to move away from the state’s heavy hand in the economy needs to be examined from the perspective of a private sector that will not be as good a replacement in attaining rapid growth.

Without answering these questions, the end result will be a mish mash of priorities that will make Ethiopia’s ambition to become an African “beacon of prosperity” quite complex.Tas con

 

/ Addis Fortune Aug 16,2020 editorial (Cartoon: courtesy of AF)

የሞትና አካል ጉዳት አደጋ በኦሮሚያ ተቃውሞ ሠልፎች–መንግሥት ወቀሳ ደረሰበት!

20 Aug

Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

የኢሰመኮ ጋዜጣዊ መግለጫ

(አዲስ አበባ፤ ነሐሴ 14 ቀን 2012 ዓ.ም.) የኢትዮጵያ ሰብዓዊ መብቶች ኮሚሽን በኦሮሚያ ለተቃውሞ በተጠሩ ሰልፎች ምክንያት የሚከሰተው የሰዎች ህይወት መጥፋት በእጅጉ እንደሚያሳስበው እየገለፀ የፀጥታ ሀይሎች ተመጣጣኝ ያልሆነ ሀይል ከመጠቀም እንዲቆጠቡ ጥሪውን ያቀርባል፡፡

በክልሉ የተለያዩ ቦታዎች በተለይም በአሳሳ፣ አሰቦት፣ አወዳይ፣ ባሌ ሮቤ፣ ጭሮ፣ ደንገጎ፣ ድሬ ጠያራ፣ ዶዶላ፣ ገለምሶ፣ ጊኒር፣ ሀሮማያ፣ ሂርና እና ሻሸመኔ የሞት ጉዳት መድረሱን ኮሚሽኑ ከተለያዩ ምንጮች መረጃ ደርሶታል፡፡

የሞት ጉዳቶቹ የደረሱት የኦሮሞ ተቃዋሚ ፓርቲ ፖለቲከኞች እንዲለቀቁ በተጠሩ የተቃውሞ ሰልፎች እንደሆነም ለማወቅ ተችሏል፡፡
‹‹የመንግስት አካላት የዜጎችን በሰላማዊ መልኩ ተቃውሞ የማሰማት መብት ማረጋገጥ እንዳለባቸው እና ሕግ የማስከበር ስራ ተመጣጣኝነት እንዲጠብቅ ማድረግ እንደሚጠበቅባቸው›› የኮሚሽኑ ከፍተኛ አማካሪ እና ቃል አቀባይ አቶ አሮን ማሾ ገልፀዋል፡፡

‹‹የኦሮሚያ ክልል በዚህ አመት የተከሰቱ አሳዛኝ ግድያዎች ከፈጠሩት ሰቆቃ አሁንም ፈጽሞ አላገገመም፡፡ እነዚህ ከፍተኛ የመብት ጥሰት አዝማሚያዎች እንዲቀጥሉ ሊፈቀድላቸው አይገባም›› በማለት አክለው ገልጸዋል፡፡

እስካሁን በአንዳንድ ሚዲያዎች የወጡ ሪፖርቶችና በማህበራዊ ሚዲያ የተለቀቁ መረጃዎች የሞቱ ሰዎችን ቁጥር በሚመለከት የተለያየ አሀዝ አስቀምጠዋል፡፡ ኢሰመኮ የደረሰውን ሞትና ጉዳት መጠን ለማረጋገጥ ከየአካባቢው ነዋሪዎች፣ ምስክሮች፣ ሆስፒታሎችና የአስተዳደር አካላት መረጃ በማሰባሰብ ላይ ይገኛል፡፡

ኢሰመኮ የፌዴራልና የክልል መንግስታት ጉዳዩን ለማጣራት በአፋጣኝ ምርመራ እንዲጀምሩ ጥሪውን ያቀርባል፡፡

 

 

የብልፅግናን ቆማሪነት የኦፒዶዎው ሽመልስ አብዲሣ አጋላጭነት ኢትዮጵያን ለብርሃን አብቅቷል!

15 Aug

Posted by The EthiopiaObservatory (TEO)

 

 

 

Our ‘protectors’ in blue: Gruesome police brutality and misconduct in Ethiopia

15 Aug

Posted by The EthiopiaObservatory (TEO)

To change the policing culture in Ethiopia, the focus needs to be on systemic failings, not just individual accountability

It was only a year ago that a video showing two police officers assaulting a handcuffed man and an elderly woman was widely shared among the public. For most of us that saw the altercation, the police’s brazen and disproportionate use of force was not only a wrong that needed to be investigated—it was also yet another example of the type of police brutality we see on an almost daily basis.

Whether it is intimidation, harassment or physical abuse of ordinary members of the public, we have seen such acts being routinely used by both the Addis Ababa and Federal Police forces. In this context, the speed and intensity in which this video was shared and discussed among the public garnered the attention of the Addis Ababa Police Commission, which vowed to not only investigate the incident but to also make the findings of such an investigation public.

However, this denunciation also came with a caveat that attempted to explain away the incident as the misguided actions of newly recruited police officers. It is this contrast between understanding police brutality as either an individual’s fault or a systemic issue that this article wishes to explore. A year after this incident and with no public investigations in sight, this article seeks to provide an assessment of how Ethiopia’s legal system conceptualizes and penalizes the type of police brutality we see on a daily basis.

Legal safeguards

As one of the most powerful civil institutions in the country, the Federal Police Commission plays an important role in protecting the rights of civilians and maintaining their peaceful way of life. Whether it is through its investigative, disciplinary, or other enforcement powers, the police are not only the most visible extension of the state but also have a unique set of responsibilities that directly affects each citizen and their quality of life. However, in exercising these important functions, the police are obligated to not only enforce the laws of the country but to also adhere to them. Whether one looks at the Federal Police Commission Proclamations of 20002003 or 2011, an officer’s duty to serve and protect has always been explicitly and intrinsically linked with their obligation to respect the country’s constitution, Criminal Code, and other relevant laws.

This dual obligation to respect and enforce the law is further reinforced by the Federal Police Officers Administration Regulation of 2012, which not only requires police officers to respect international human rights instruments but also assigns personal liability to each officer that violates this legal obligation. Furthermore, by placing strict restrictions on an officer’s use of force as well as classifying any acts of intimidation, human rights violations or sexual harassment as grave disciplinary offences that warrant dismissal, this regulation goes a long way in safeguarding the public from police misconduct and brutality.

Similarly, the Ethiopian Criminal Code does not shy away from labelling police misconduct as severe breaches of public trust that warrant criminal liability. In fact, given the sentences put in place for the crimes of abusing one’s power, the dereliction of duty or the use of improper methods, it is safe to say that the Criminal Code unequivocally punishes those police officers who disregard legal safeguards in order to threaten, intimidate, or brutalize their fellow citizens.

Regrettably, these legal safeguards have achieved very little in tackling the culture of police misconduct and brutality in both the Federal and the Addis Ababa police. Whether it is the excessive reliance on corporal punishment, the misuse and mishandling of government-issued weapons, the verbal harassment of civilians, or the physical intimidation of members of the public, the frequency in which we are witnesses to these illegal acts speaks to an entrenched culture of impunity that, for the most part, has been overlooked. As such, it is important to assess the efficacy of those oversight mechanisms that seek to investigate and penalize the type of police brutality we see on a daily basis.

Oversight mechanisms

Since its establishment in June 2000, the Federal Police Commission has sought to tackle this entrenched culture of police misconduct through three oversight mechanisms. The first was the Federal Police Complaint Hearing Committee, which was established with the broad mandate of investigating any allegations of police misconduct and abuse of power.  By April of 2003, this committee was replaced by the Federal Police Complaint Hearing Organ, an institution that solely investigated allegations of serious police misconduct. The current iteration of the police’s internal oversight mechanism is the Federal Police Officers Disciplinary Committees, which is comprised of multiple committees that exclusively investigate allegations of serious police misconduct and impose the appropriate penalties, irrespective of any court proceedings or decisions.

By transitioning from a single institution with a largely broad mandate to multiple disciplinary committees that exclusively investigate a particular type of police misconduct, this evolution of the police’s oversight mechanism is indicative of one thing. Namely, that the government is very much aware of the frequency with which serious police misconduct occurs and has subsequently tried to reform their institutions in order to address this issue. Given the availability of these disciplinary committees in every sector of the police force, their exclusive focus on serious police misconduct as well as their ability to dismiss an officer irrespective of any outstanding court proceedings, it is safe to say that the Federal Police Officers Disciplinary Committees aspire to provide some redress to victims of police intimidation, harassment, and abuse of power.

Unfortunately, despite such reforms, these discipline committees have done very little to hamper the type of police misconduct we routinely see. Whether one looks at the excessive use of force by police officers, their verbal and physical harassment of civilians, or the public’s unawareness of this oversight body, it is quite clear that these disciplinary committees have failed to change the culture of impunity in both the Federal and Addis Ababa police.

In order to understand why this is the case, it is important to discuss one important aspect of these oversight mechanisms that the government has consistently refrained from reforming: the purpose behind these oversight mechanisms and their investigatory powers.

Individual accountability

In fact, if one were to look at Article 52 of the Federal Police Officers Administration Regulation, it quickly becomes apparent that these committees are only mandated to investigate individual instances of police misconduct in order to either rehabilitate or dismiss those officers that are abusing their authority.

If anything, this singular focus on individual accountability is a clear indication of how the government views instances of police misconduct. Namely, as isolated incidents that are not indicative of an entrenched and systemic pattern of abuse. This is evidenced by the fact that neither the 2000 Federal Police Proclamation, the 2003 Federal Police Commission Proclamation, the 2011 Federal Police Commission Proclamation nor the 2012 Federal Police Officers Administration Regulation make any mention of victims of police misconduct, the type of redress they should be afforded, or how these oversight mechanisms plan to address structural causes of police brutality.

It is the opinion of this author that such a myopic and individualistic understanding of police accountability has directly contributed to the failure of these oversight mechanisms in providing the public what it so desperately needs. That is, an impartial institution that not only compensates victims of police brutality but one that also proposes policies and guidelines that can reduce the likelihood of similar violations occurring in the future. Given that these principles of restitution, compensation, and guarantees of non-repetition are essential for providing an effective remedy to victims of police brutality, the limited and punitive mandate of the Federal Police Officers Disciplinary Committees falls short of the government’s national and international obligations.

Whether one looks at the African Union’s Luanda and Robben Island Guidelines or the United Nations’ Declaration on Justice for Victims of Abuse of Power and their Basic Principles on the Use of Force & Firearms, each of these instruments obligate the Ethiopian government to establish a disciplinary committee that can investigate and tackle police misconduct at both the individual and systemic level. Instead, by purporting to only hold rogue police officers accountable, we have been left with an oversight mechanism that, at least on paper, prioritizes individual accountability over systemic reform.

In conclusion, given the robust legal safeguards that seek to protect the public from police misconduct and brutality, it is safe to say that the prevalence of these illegal acts is largely attributable to ineffectual oversight mechanisms that, for the last 20 years, have turned a blind eye to the root causes of what we see on a daily basis.  Whether it is the excessive reliance on corporal punishments, the misuse and mishandling of government issued weapons, the verbal harassment of civilians or the physical intimidation of members of the public, the inability to eradicate this culture of abuse has resulted in these illegal acts being synonymous with our police forces.

As such, even if the current oversight mechanism has other structural issues that need to be re-evaluated—the composition of the committees, the lack of procedural transparency or its non-existent public engagement strategy—the success of any effort to reform these issues would be severely curtailed if we were to overlook this institution’s narrow mandate.

As evidenced by last year’s infamous video, aspiring to only hold individual officers accountable does little to change the culture of policing in Ethiopia.

/EthiopiaInsight

 

 

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